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ABSTRACT 
Since 1990, the California tribal casino industry has grown from a very small and 
insignificant industry to one with annual gross gaming revenues of about $7.5 billion 
per annum by 2009. Over this same period, Nevada's gaming revenues grew from 
approximately $5.0 billion in 1990 to $10.4 billion in 2009, having declined from a peak 
of $12.8 billion in 2007. Much of the recent decline in Nevada and especially Las Vegas 
can be attributed to the severity of the economic recession of 2007-2009. However, 
the major Northern Nevada destination resorts of Reno and South Lake Tahoe had 
experienced substantial slowdowns or contraction of their gaming industries since the 
advent of California tribal gaming in the early 1990s, as measured in a number of ways, 
including number of gaming devices, employment, and gross gaming revenues adjusted 
for inflation. Las Vegas, on the other hand, had experienced substantial real growth over 
this same period, until the Great Recession of 2007-2009, at which point it experienced a 
dramatic reversal of fortune. 
This analysis estimates demand relationships for gaming activity in the major 
tourism markets in Northern and Southern Nevada, by specifying a number of variables 
that relate to the demand for gambling in these markets as well as noting monthly 
seasonal shifts. It also examines the competitive links between the expansion of 
California tribal gaming and the Nevada casino industry's economic performance. 
Regression analysis is utilized to establish the relationship between the growth and 
expansion of tribal casinos in California and the expansion or contraction of gaming in 
Nevada's major regions of Reno, Lake Tahoe, and the Las Vegas Strip. 
Keywords: California tribal gaming, Nevada gaming demand, regression analysis, 
economic downturn 
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I. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF NEVADA'S GAMING MARKETS, 1990 TO 
2007 
Between 1990 and 2007, gaming revenues in Northern Nevada experienced flat or 
negative growth, whereas those in Las Vegas experienced robust growth throughout the 
1990s, followed by slower positive growth since the tum of the century.' Beginning in 
late 2007, the negative growth ofNorthem Nevada gaming revenues accelerated, largely 
as a result of the 2007-2009 Great Recession along with openings or expansions of key 
major tribal casinos in Northern Califomia.2 When corrected for inflation, both of the 
major Northern Nevada gaming markets-Reno and South Lake Tahoe--experienced 
negative real growth, in terms of gaming revenues corrected for inflation, employment, 
and the number of stations available (positions at table games plus the number of gaming 
devices) for possible customers. These declines are documented in Charts 1-4. 
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1. Nevada Gaming Control Board, Nevada Gaming Abstracts (annual), 1990 to 2009. 
2. Red Hawk Casino opened in Shingle Springs, on the main highway between Sacramento and South Lake Tahoe, in 
December 2008. Thunder Valley Casino, which had opened in Lincoln, about I 0 miles from the main highway between 
Sacramento and Reno in 2003, completed a $1 billion expansion with hotel and other amenities in June 2010. 
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CHART3 
SOUTH LAKE TAHOE 
REAL GAMING REVENUES, 1990-2009 
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CHART4 
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS, 
SOUTH LAKE TAHOE CASINOS 1990-2009 
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By 2009, a number of major 
tribal casinos had opened in 
the Northern California market, 
competing directly for regional 
customers with the casinos in 
Reno and Lake Tahoe. 
There are three factors that explain much of the stagnation and 
decline in the Northern Nevada casino markets. First, Lake 
Tahoe casinos were effectively constrained from expansions 
dating back to the passage of the Amended Tahoe Regional 
Planning Compact of 1980.3 This eliminated the construction 
of new casinos at South Lake Tahoe and put considerable 
constraints on the ability of existing properties to alter their 
physical facilities. Second and more importantly, Congress 
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 19884, and this 
eventually led to the creation of substantial tribal casino 
industries in California, Oregon and Washington, as states signed compacts and tribes took 
advantage of their economic opportunities. By 2009, a number of major tribal casinos had 
opened in the Northern California market, competing directly for regional customers with 
the casinos in Reno and Lake Tahoe. Third, the period from 1989 until 2007 marked a 
wave of unprecedented growth and expansion of the gaming-based tourist industry in Las 
Vegas. The expansion ofLas Vegas' mega-casinos, coupled with increasingly affordable 
3. Public Law 96-551, December 19, 1980 
4. Public Law 100-497, October 18, 1988 
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a i r  t r a v e l  t o  L a s  V e g a s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f r o m  m a j o r  c i t i e s  i n  t h e  W e s t e r n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  
W e s t e r n  C a n a d a ,  m a d e  L a s  V e g a s  a  r e a s o n a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  t r a d i t i o n a l  N o r t h e r n  
N e v a d a  g a m i n g  c u s t o m e r s .
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e m e r g i n g  c o m p e t i t i o n  f r o m  C a l i f o r n i a  t r i b a l  g a m i n g  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  c a s i n o s  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  C a n a d a .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  r a t i o  o f  g a m i n g  r e v e n u e s  t o  t o t a l  
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II. THE GREAT RECESSION AND ITS IMPACTS ON NEVADA GAMING 
With the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the economic performance of the casino 
gaming industry in each of Nevada's main tourist destinations-the Las Vegas Strip, 
Reno, and South Lake Tahoe-was dramatically and negatively affected. Furthermore, in 
the early period of recovery for the U.S. economy from the second half of 2009 through 
With the Great Recession of2007-
2009, the economic performance 
of the casino gaming industry in 
each of Nevada s main tourist 
destinations-the Las Vegas Strip, 
Reno, and South Lake Tahoe-
was dramatically and negatively 
affected. 
mid-2010, there was not much relief in the downward trends 
for Nevada's major tourist gaming markets. Over the thirty 
month period ending in June 2010, gaming revenues (in current 
dollars) fell17.7%, 25.2%, and 32.8% in the Strip, Reno and 
Tahoe markets respectively. The secondary southern Nevada 
tourist destinations of Downtown Las Vegas and Laughlin 
declined by 20.4% and 23.9% over the same period.7 
Other tourism indicators showed many of the same trends. 
For all of Las Vegas, average daily room rates fell29.6% 
between 2007 and 2009, and occupancy rates declined from 
90.4% in 2007 to 81.5% in 2009. Visitation fell 7.4% over 
that period, from 39.2 million visitors in 2007 to 36.3 million 
visitors in 2009, and visitors were spending less per capita on 
both gaming and non-gaming activities.8 For an industry that 
had seen multiple multi-billion dollar mega-casino resort properties developed over the 
past two decades, the decline in hotel room revenues was arguably more devastating on 
profitability and solvency than was the decline in gaming revenues. Indeed, this period 
saw significant bankruptcies (Station Casinos, Cosmopolitan, Riviera, Terrible Herbst, 
etc.), and postponed, bankrupt, or cancelled multi-billion dollar projects (Fontainbleau, 
Echelon Place, the Plaza, Crown, MGM-Kerzner, etc.), with all of the major Las Vegas 
Strip casino companies (Harrah's, MGM, Las Vegas Sands, Wynn, Boyd Gaming, 
Riviera, etc.) enduring severe financial turmoil from 2008 onward. 
For an industry that many analysts and pundits had classified as "recession-resilient", 
if not "recession-proof', such dramatic declines surprised and shocked the major casino 
companies, the banks and other financial institutions that had financed much of the 
decade's expansion. Furthermore, the Nevada state government was disproportionately 
dependent on taxes on gaming revenues and retail sales to tourists for funding the state 
budget, and the decline in gaming revenues and visitor spending created a substantial 
fiscal crisis for the state. 
In retrospect, spending on casino gaming and related activities proved to be far 
more sensitive to (substantial) economic downturns than had previously been believed. 
Furthermore, the ability of Nevada-style gaming-based tourism to bounce back has been 
painfully slow, and has lagged the recovery of the national U.S. economy. For the 12 
months ended June 2010, statewide gaming revenues in Nevada were down by 4.3% over 
the comparable period in 2009, a period when the U.S. economy was expanding at about 
a 3.0% rate.9 
The distinctions between Northern Nevada and Southern Nevada gaming industries 
can be seen by tracking the level of gaming activity against a broad index of economic 
activity. Handle10 for the Reno and Las Vegas gaming markets (using a 12 month moving 
average) was charted against a national Index of Weekly Leading Indicators (WLI)ll with 
7. Monthly Revenue Reports, Q!!. fi!. 
8. Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, Visitor Statistics, retrieved from http://www.lvcva.com/press/statistics-facts/ 
visitor-stats.jsp 
9. Estimate based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, estimated real GOP growth rates, 2009-III to 2010-II. 
I 0. "Handle" is defined as the total amount of money wagered at gaming opportunities (i.e. tables and slot machines). It can be 
used as the total quantity of gaming services sold (standardized to a $1 unit), whereas "House Advantage", which represents 
the percentage of each dollar wagered retained by the casino, is the equivalent of price. Gross gaming revenues, reflecting 
total winnings for the casino, are therefore the aggregate of House Advantage times Handle (price times quantity), added up 
over all gaming options within the casino. 
II. The Weekly Leading Index (WLI) is published by the Economic Cycle Research Institute and is constructed of seven 
weekly economic series for the U.S.: money supply, Journal of Commerce-ECRI industrial materials price index, initial 
unemployment insurance claims, mortgage applications, the S&P 500 index, 10-year Treasury bond yield, and bond quality 
spread. More information on the WLI can be found at http://www.businesscycle.com/. 
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a 10-month lag, and the results are presented in Charts 6 and 7. Clearly, the Las Vegas 
experience correlates with the WLI series, but consistently outperforms it for most of the 
period, at least until the end of 2007. On the other hand, the Reno handle numbers show a 
strong correlation over the first portion of the period under study, but beginning in around 
2002, Reno handle diverges dramatically from the direction of the Index, experiencing a 
general downward trend which then accelerates downward in 2007. 
CHART6 
Las Vegas Handle Vs. WLI + 10 Months 
Jan 1990 -Jan 2009 
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III. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Over the years, there have only been a handful of demand and revenue studies that 
have looked specifically at the casino industry, or even more generally at other gaming 
and wagering industries. A number of early studies concentrated on estimating price 
elasticities for pari-mutuel wagering at horse race tracks, with the objective of estimating 
an optimal take-out rate ("house advantage", or price) that would optimize total revenues 
accruing to the operator and to the government in taxes (Suits, ( 1979), Morgan and Vache 
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(1979), Morgan and Vache (1982), Thalheimer and Ali (2003)). Cargill and Eadington 
(1978) looked at the time-series behavior of Nevada gaming revenues to evaluate 
forecasting outside the realm of causal models, and Levitsky et al (2000) examined the 
relationship of social attitudes toward gambling and gaming revenues. 
Another group of studies, which looked specifically at the casino industry in various 
jurisdictions, estimated the effect of changing regulations, technologies, or other factors 
on the demand for gaming (Nichols ( 1998a), Nichols ( 1998b ), Thalheimer and Ali ( 1992, 
1995a, 1995b, and 2008). Findings of these studies generally determined that relaxation 
of artificial regulatory constraints (i.e. casino floor space minimums per game) and 
introduction of new product delivery systems (i.e. telephone wagering) increases gaming 
revenues and the demand for gambling, whereas smoking bans have pronounced negative 
effects on the demand for casino gaming. Other studies have looked at competitive and 
cross-elasticity issues, examining the effect on demand of newly authorized cross-border 
competition with identical or similar forms of gambling, from the legalization of different 
forms of gambling (i.e. casinos) on existing gaming or wagering industries, or based 
on the "newness" of gaming facilities or their ability to differentiate product based on 
non-gaming amenities (Hunsaker (2001), Przybylski et al (1998), Thalheimer and Ali 
(2003), Thalheimer (1998), Lauve (2007)). This particular study most closely follows the 
approach of the last group of studies. 
IV. MODELLING THE DEMAND FOR NEVADA GAMING 
In general, the economic performance of casinos in a particular geographic market 
can be monitored by measuring the demand for gaming services. The quantity of gaming 
services sold can be measured by the metric of Handle (computed as Gross Gaming 
Revenues divided by House Advantage, which serves as a measure of the average price 
of gambling). 
The demand for gaming services is a function of a number of factors, including: 
• proximity to the customer base (both local and tourist); 
• the level of income and wealth of the potential visitor population; 
• price of gaming and complementary non-gaming offerings; 
competition from other venues that offer identical or similar gaming options; 
competition from other venues that offer alternative tourism options which are not 
related to gaming; 
• transportation costs, such as airfares and price of gasoline, and 
• other factors that affect the relative attractiveness or convenience of the location in 
question relative to other locations. 
Other factors that influence demand for a tourist based casino industry include prices 
and costs that confront consumers in the casino market as well as in competing tourist 
(gaming and non-gaming) markets; prices of complementary and substitute goods (i.e. 
accommodation costs, such as hotel room and restaurant prices in the particular geographic 
market and in competing gaming and non-gaming locales); attractiveness factors, such 
as the general ambience to be found in specific casinos in the neighborhoods or business 
districts where such facilities are offered; the quantity, quality and variety of non-gaming 
amenities that are made available to attract customers; and "external shock" factors, such as 
the changes in consumer behavior that followed the events of September 11, 2001. 
The causal factors that influence tourism behavior and spending can be roughly 
translated into short term and long term components. Changes in prices of substitutes 
and complements can be categorized as short term influences, whereas changes in supply 
factors (such as the legal status of gaming elsewhere, the number, vintage and quality 
of casinos in the marketplace and in competing markets, and important infrastructure 
characteristics in the markets under study as well as in competing markets) are more 
long term in nature. This study looks at both short term and long term factors and utilizes 
available data to determine if causality can be assigned to specific potential contributors 
to a market's performance. 
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Since the early 1990s, the quantity and quality of casinos in gaming jurisdictions that 
effectively compete for Reno and South Lake Tahoe tourist customers have increased 
dramatically. Las Vegas became an increasingly important competitor for Northern 
Nevada, because of its substantial supply-side growth and evolution as it became an 
increasingly important national and global destination resort venue, with "state of the art" 
mega-casino complexes and a wide variety of entertainment, conference, and recreation 
offerings unmatched anywhere else in the world. Commercial casinos were authorized 
in more than fifteen states between 1988 and 2009, mainly east of the Mississippi, but 
also in Colorado, South Dakota, Missouri, Louisiana, and Iowa. Tribal gaming industries 
became well established in the states of Oregon, Washington, Arizona, and elsewhere in 
the United States, but most importantly for Nevada, in California. 
The competitive response by Northern Nevada gaming jurisdictions was limited. 
Casinos in Northern Nevada did relatively little to reinvest in and grow their properties 
in light of increased regional and national competition, due primarily to the pessimistic 
outlook with respect to Expected Returns on Invested Capital (EROIC) in new casino 
ventures. There were some notable capital improvements made to various Northern 
Nevada casino properties over the past two decades, such as Atlantis, Pepperrnill, 
Harrah's, John Ascuaga's Nugget, Montbleu, and the Grand Sierra (formerly the Reno 
Hilton) but, in comparison to investments in Las Vegas and California tribal gaming 
facilities, these were very modest. Furthermore, the number of new tourist-oriented 
casinos developed in the Renoffahoe markets was limited to only a handful: the Silver 
Legacy (1995) and the Siena (2001) were the only major new tourist-oriented casino 
resorts to come on the scene in Northern Nevada for the past two decades. 
In light of the deterioration in the tourist market for Renoffahoe casinos, many 
Reno area casinos repositioned themselves to take advantage of the locals' market in the 
first decade of the millennium. In this regard, some casinos found themselves in more 
favorable positions than others, because of location, access, amenities, and increased 
marketing efforts toward locals. Some small casinos such as Gold Dust West and 
Tamarack opened specifically to cater to local clientele, and many others, including the 
Pepperrnill and Atlantis, geared their marketing strategies to be attractive to both local 
and tourist customers. 
V. REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
One specific question of interest in this analysis is to see if the particular impacts of 
expanded California tribal gaming on the demand for Nevada casino gaming services can 
be quantified and verified. The following general model was developed for the Northern 
Nevada markets of Reno-Sparks and South Lake Tahoe. 
Quantity = F(Price, Price of substitutes, Income, Availability of substitutes, 
Transport costs, General economic performance, Seasonality) 
The individual variables were defined and measured as follows: 
Quantity = Handle = Gross Gaming Revenues divided by Win Percentage 
Price = Win percentage (house advantage) on slot machines for that gaming 
market 
Income =Northern California Aggregate Personal Income 
Availability of Substitutes = Number of slot machines offered in Northern 
California tribal casinos12 
Transport costs= price index for airfares13 and price index for gasoline14 
General Economic Performance = WLI Index 15 
Seasonality is measured with a series of dummy variables (one dummy variable 
for each of the first 11 months), with December serving as the base for comparison 
12. Northern California casinos include all those north of 37 degrees latitude, which is an east-west delineation approximately 
25 miles south of San Jose. This includes a total of 28 tribal casinos. 
13. Passenger Origin and Destination (O&D) Survey, Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 
14. Motor Gasoline Price Survey, US Energy Information Administration 
15. c.f. footnote 11 
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The time series observations for Reno-Sparks and South Lake Tahoe are based on 
monthly data from December 1994 to January 2009. All regressions are estimated as 
log-linear equations. Thus, for numerical independent variables, the resulting estimated 
coefficients are BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimates) of demand elasticities. 16 For the 
seasonal dummy variables, the interpretation of the coefficients is the average percentage 
change from the December base. Thus, the seasonal dummy coefficients estimate the 
typical shift relative to December that occurs in that month, after correcting for all other 
causal factors. 
Significance of the individual coefficients is noted by asterisks. Coefficients 
significant at the 1% level are noted with(***). Coefficients significant at the 5% level 
are noted with(**), and coefficients significant at the 10% level are noted with(*). 
The functional form used in the following regressions was the following: 
Log(Handle) =a+ ~l*log (Price)+ ~2*log (Income)+ ... 
In such a model, the coefficients of independent variables can be interpreted as 
elasticities, and the coefficients for dummy variables can be interpreted as (adjusted) 
percentage shifts from the base condition. 
The following tables present the log-log regression results for the Northern Nevada 
gaming markets. 
TABLEt 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR RENO-SPARKS AND SOUTH LAKE TAHOE 
CASINO MARKET RENO-SPARKS SOUTHLAKE 
TAHOE 
SAMPLE SIZE 170 169 
ADJUSTEDR' .8924 .6770 
F-VALUE 83.47*** 21.71*** 
VARIABLES 
(!-values) 
-.7104 -.0333 
House advantage (-3.9317)*** (-1.5609) 
-.0714 .0964 
Gasoline Prices (-1.7485)* (.2158) 
Tribal Northern -.2329 -.1049 
California Slots (-14.4726)*** (-2.5621)*** 
Northern California 
Aggregate Personal .6101 .4271 
Income (6.0505}*** (1.7040)* 
-0.5540 -1.0458 
Airfares index (-4.5083)*** (-3.3919)*** 
Lead Econ Indicator .3869 .1734 
(WLI) (3.4541 )*** (0.6380) 
-.0203 
-.0333 
Jan (-2.3513)*** (-1.5609l 
-.0068 .0087 
Feb (-0.7421) (-0.3997) 
.0620 
-.0124 
Mar (5.8830)*** (-0.5631) 
.0527 .0219 
Apr (4.7546)*** (1.1024) 
.0805 .0396 
May (7.2280)*** (1.7319)* 
.0598 .1760 
Jun (5.63072*** (7.7223)*** 
.0863 .1591 
Jul (8.1406)*** (6.9847)*** 
.0950 .1052 
Aug (8.6704)*** (4.6159)*** 
.0861 .0356 
Sep (8.0240)*** (1.56401. 
.0749 -.0361 
Oct (7.1011)*** (-1.6027) 
.0280 
-.0010 
Nov (2.9117)*** (-0.0458) 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
(one period lag) 1.5558 1.9574 
Durbin Watson Statistic 
(twelve period lag) 1.8726 1.9309 
16. Demand elasticity measures the ratio of percentage change in the dependent variable to a percentage change in an 
independent variable, ceteris paribus. 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
For the Reno-Sparks market, the signs of the independent variables are all consistent 
with the specified demand model. The relationship with handle and house advantage 
(price) is negative and slightly inelastic. Demand is also negatively related, ceteris paribus, 
to Northern California gasoline prices and airline fares. Northern California aggregate 
personal income and the index of leading economic indicators exert a positive influence on 
demand (handle), as expected. The number of slot machines at Northern California tribal 
casinos, serving as a proxy for the availability of tribal gaming as a substitute for gaming in 
the Reno market, has a negative impact with an estimated elasticity of -0.23, suggesting that 
a 10% increase in the capacity of tribal casinos in Northern California leads to a reduction 
in demand of about 2.3% in the Reno-Sparks market. 
All of the independent variables are significant at the 1% level (except for gasoline 
prices, significant at the 10% level), as are the seasonal dummy variables (with the 
exception of February) suggesting a high degree of predictable seasonality in the data 
series, even after accounting for the causal factors. The adjusted R2 value of .8924 and 
F-value of83.47 imply a strong overall fit. The Durbin-Watson statistic is at 1.5558, 
suggesting some degree of auto-correlation in the data. However, when the Durbin-
Watson statistic was computed using a 12 period lag (for the 12 months), the value of 
1.8726 suggested no auto-correlation issue. 
For South Lake Tahoe, the results are similar, but not nearly so robust. All causal 
variables except for gasoline prices are properly signed, though house advantage, 
gasoline prices and leading economic indicators are not significantly different than 
zero. Seasonality factors are generally not significant except 
for the summer months, perhaps suggesting less consistency 
due to such factors as winter weather and road conditions. 
The expansion of California tribal gaming, as measured by the 
number of Northern California tribal slot machines, has had a 
significant negative impact on South Lake Tahoe handle, with 
an estimated elasticity of -0.1047. The Durbin Watson lagged 
one period at 1.9574 and lagged 12 periods at 1.9309 suggests 
no presence of auto-correlation. 
VII. RESULTS FOR THE LAS VEGAS STRIP 
The expansion of California tribal 
gaming, as measured by the number 
ofNorthern California tribal slot 
machines, has had a significant 
negative impact on South Lake 
Tahoe handle. 
The experience of the casino industry on the Las Vegas Strip was markedly different 
from the Northern Nevada casinos, largely because of the continuing evolution and 
development of ever-larger and more expensive casino resort complexes. Until2007, 
these had the effect of broadening the attractiveness of the Las Vegas Strip as a national 
and international destination resort, and of encouraging even further capital investments 
in new and existing resorts. 
There was also a belief that the expansions of casino gaming into new jurisdictions, 
including California tribal gaming, was having only negligible impacts on demand for 
Las Vegas Strip-style tourism. Since 1990, in spite of the fact that casino gaming had 
proliferated throughout the United States and many foreign countries, the belief was that 
the Strip and its major properties had stayed ahead of the curve and offered a unique 
tourism product with not only gaming but a wide variety of complementary non-gaming 
offerings. It was not until the Great Recession that these beliefs came under serious 
questioning. 
Regression analysis for the demand for gaming on the Las Vegas Strip is presented 
in Table 2. As with the other demand models, the dependent variable is handle (Gross 
Gaming Revenues divided by house advantage). 
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TABLE2 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR LAS VEGAS STRIP GAMING MARKET 
V. CALIFORNIA TRIBAL GAMING 
LOG-LOG RESULTS, 1995 TO 2009 (MONTHLY DATA) 
CASINO LAS VEGAS 
MARKET STRIP 
SAMPLE SIZE 170 
ADJUSTEDRl .5757 
F-VALUE 14.49*** 
VARIABLES 
(t-values) 
-.7589 
House advantage ( -8.04391_** * 
.1251 
Gasoline Prices (3.2393)*** 
.0749 
Airfares (0.3679) 
Tribal Slots in -.0507 
California ( -1.2651) 
California 
Aggregate .4523 
Personal Income (2.1506)** 
Lead Economic 2.8214 
Indicator (2.8990)*** 
-.0111 
Jan (-.7810) 
-.0362 
Feb 
_(-2.912'!1_*** 
-.0282 
Mar ( -2.1418)** 
-.0583 
Apr (-4.3906)*** 
-.0229 
May (-1.7208)* 
-.0713 
Jun (-5.3161)*** 
-.0451 
Jul (-3.3668)*** 
-.0312 
Aug (-2.3836)*** 
-.0383 
Sep ( -2.8391 )*** 
-.0263 
Oct ( -1.9524)* 
-.0416 
Nov _(_-3.2212)_*** 
Durbin Watson 
Statistic (one 1.6025 
period lag) 
Durbin Watson 
Statistic (twelve 1.7290 
period lag) 
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VIII. DISCUSSION 
As with the earlier regressions for Reno-Sparks and South Lake Tahoe, the overall 
results are significant and, for the most part, consistent with a traditional model of 
demand. Four of the causal variables were significant (house advantage, California 
tribal slot machines, gasoline prices, and the leading economic indicator index), and 
three were properly signed, whereas gasoline prices were significant but opposite what 
the model would predict. (Interestingly, airfares were not significant in the analysis of 
Las Vegas Strip demand, and were incorrectly signed.) The seasonal dummy variables 
were almost all significant, indicating predictable and consistent seasonal trends in the 
dependent variable after adjustment for the causal variables. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
for one-period and 12-period lags (1.60 and 1.73) suggests a moderate presence of auto-
correlation in the error terms. 
Of note to this analysis is the estimate associated with California tribal slots. 
Elasticity is estimated at -.051, indicating, for example, that a 10% increase in slot 
machines among tribal casinos in California would have a 0.5% negative impact on 
handle in Las Vegas Strip casinos. This is markedly less than the estimated elasticities for 
Reno (-0.233) and South Lake Tahoe (-0.116), suggesting that the impact of California 
tribal gaming on demand for gaming on the Las Vegas Strip is indeed weaker than on 
other regions in the State. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis has demonstrated that demand for gaming in Nevada's major tourism 
areas can be analyzed using traditional micro-economic 
analysis coupled with empirical analysis. For the most part, 
results presented here are consistent with a priori expectations, 
with some markets being far more robust than others. 
The primary finding of this analysis is that the expansion 
of California tribal gaming since 1990 has had significant 
negative impacts on the demand for gaming in each of the 
three destination resort gaming markets studied here, with the 
strongest impacts on Reno and South Lake Tahoe, and smaller 
The impact of California tribal 
gaming on demand for gaming 
on the Las Vegas Strip is indeed 
weaker than on other regions in 
the State. 
(but not measurably significant) negative impacts on demand for gaming on the Las 
Vegas Strip. 
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